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MORAL DISTANCE: INTRODUCTION 
This issue of The Monist is devoted to the question of how we should 
gauge the moral significance of distance. "Moral distance," by analogy 
with "aesthetic distance," may signify degrees of moral indifference, but that 
is not the theme we are concerned with here. The problem of distance in 
morality is not the same as that of moral indifference; it is about boundaries. 
Boundaries demarcate not only physical, political, and other space 
but the moral space of inclusion and exclusion determining the limit and 
extent of our moral concern. One important issue debated among ethicists 
is the relevance of distance in determining moral boundaries. It may seem 
intuitively obvious that distance, both physical and relational, makes a 
significant difference in our obligations to help others. Intuition seems to 
tell us that we should help someone in need nearby, all else being the 
same, over someone similarly situated in a far-away place. Likewise, it 
may seem intuitively correct to hold that we have a greater obligation to 
help those with whom we have relational or affective ties than to help 
strangers. Distance seems to set moral boundaries, and distant strangers 
are accorded minimal moral concern. 
Ethical traditions that base morality on human nature claim that distance 
over time and place matters morally because humans are by nature unsuited 
to show equal concern to distant people and events compared to those near 
in time and place. Aristotle observed that "disasters that have just 
happened or are soon to happen excite more pity [than those in the distant 
past or future]." (Rhetoric, 1386a; see also Rhetoric, 1388alO.) Later Hume 
famously stated: "The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when 
at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred 
leagues distant." (Treatise, 2.3.7.) In contrast, Peter Singer, who initiated 
the contemporary discussion of moral distance and moral boundaries in 
his essay "Famine, Affluence and Morality" (1972), argues that the 
interests of strangers, near or far, should count as much as those of friends 
and neighbors. 
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But if distance is irrelevant, does this not make morality excessively 
demanding and excessively impersonal? If, on the other hand, moral 
obligation does indeed vary with distance, might this not imply a callous 
indifference to many in need? These questions are the main thrust of the 
essays that follow. The authors also examine such issues as whether temporal 
and cultural distance raises moral concerns similar to those raised by physical 
and relational distance. 
Jeremy Waldron uses the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan to 
explore the issues of the moral problem of distance. Though this parable 
relies on the proximity of two human beings and immediacy of claims of 
need that might not seem helpful in offering us a clue to the question of 
whether moral concerns diminish over distance, Waldron finds that it 
offers a good beginning. The parable evokes the intuition that the sheer 
proximity of two human beings, even in the absence of any ethnic or other 
affiliations, generates moral obligation. Waldron suggests that the impartial 
and universal moral message of the parable can be useful for morality in 
today's global world where we encounter strangers every day. 
Wendy Hamblet uses the theme of humanity and proximity, following 
the phenomenological accounts of Emmanuel Levinas and the literary 
ideas of Dostoevsky, to highlight the moral problem of distance. Contrary 
to the intuition evoked by the Good Samaritan parable, Ivan Karamazov 
(in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov) maintains that nearness frus-
trates compassion because the abject presence of the needy renders impossible 
a sense of identification needed for eliciting moral concern. Levinas, on 
the other hand, believes that moral concern can be elicited only when, in 
the immediate presence of the needy, a powerful rupture of our given 
sense of identity takes place. This rupture gives birth to conscience, which 
makes us morally awake. However, Hamblet points out that Levinas's 
account of moral obligation is problematic in the bigger world where the 
needy members of humanity live far away from the affluent and the 
powerful. But Hamblet finds a resolution to this problem of distance in 
Dostoevsky. Ivan Karamazov says that children have a special moral claim 
upon us because they are innocent and beautiful, regardless of where they 
live. It is easy to identify with their need, so Hamblet suggests that we 
should begin our moral response to humanity at large with the children of 
the world. 
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Apparently Hamblet can extend Levinas's account of moral con-
science in the proximity of another human being-which roughly echoes 
the message of the parable of the Good Samaritan-along the line that 
Waldron seems to suggest with regard to today's global world. As spheres 
of interaction constantly expand, modern technology makes it easy to 
reach the distant needy and brings their plight home. The globalization 
process makes the local encounter the global, and we understand that we 
share the same space. Unlike biblical times, the distant is not distant anymore, 
so the message of the parable may have a new relevance today in evoking 
a sense of moral duty toward the global needy. 
The moral problem of distance, to a large extent, is the problem of 
finding a resolution between the impartialists who claim that distance per 
se doesn't make a moral difference and the partialists who favor morally 
defensible partiality with regard to proximity and special ties. The moral 
implications of a human encounter, as discussed by the two essays mentioned 
above, raise key issues in this debate. The next several essays take the debate 
in various directions. 
Soran Reader claims that an encounter is a moral relationship, so it 
obligates. Even a chance meeting with a stranger is a relationship, Reader 
claims, if it contains "real connection." She defends partiality to those 
with whom we enter into a relationship by outlining a much broader rela-
tionship-based account of moral obligation than what the other partialists 
offer. This way Reader thinks she can capture the intuitions behind both 
the partialists and the impartialists, which she hopes would offer a mean-
ingful resolution to the moral problem of distance. 
Richard Arneson pursues a different angle in trying to reduce the 
tension between the impartialist demands and common-sense morality, 
which favors partiality with regard to special ties such as friendship and 
love. His act-consequentialist moral theory denies partiality but leaves 
room for special ties. He believes that if special ties could be shown to be 
of moral value, then they should be promoted impartially. He claims that 
if our culture were more receptive to consequentialism, which does not 
favor oneself and one's special ties over others and their special ties, then 
we would have had an easier time in reconciling consequentialist moral 
demands with the common-sense morality of special ties, minus its emphasis 
on partiality. 
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Like Arneson, Garrett Cullity believes that distance per se is morally 
irrelevant. However, unlike Arneson, he believes that a consequentialist 
approach to the morality of aid makes morally excessive demands, but not 
because of its stance on the moral irrelevance of remoteness. In fact, 
Cullity believes that if moral obligation were to diminish with distance, 
this would lead to moral callousness. Rather, Cullity thinks that severe 
demands for aid to distant strangers are subject to the criticism of depriving 
people of life-enhancing goods, based on self-concern and special attach-
ments to others. He believes that these reasons can be construed from an 
impartial point of view, leading to the rejection of the severe demands 
made by the consequentialists. So, unlike Arneson, Cullity finds that par-
tiality can be impartially acceptable. However, he claims, it would still 
show that one is not giving inadequate (though perhaps less) considera-
tions to other people's interests. 
Jan Narveson, too, takes distance per se to be morally irrelevant, but 
he defends a view of beneficence that is undemanding. We do not have 
any duty to help, only an obligation not to cause harm to others, either to 
compatriots or foreigners. By contrast, Kok-ChorTan tries to strike a balance 
between our duties towards compatriots and our obligation of global 
justice. He shows that global justice trumps over the demands of compa-
triots, but patriotic ties are also of value and shouldn't be rejected per se. 
Just as Arneson claims that special ties are subject to prior moral con-
straints, Tan asserts that patriotic ties are limited by impartial demands of 
global justice. However, unlike Arneson's act-consequentialism, Tan leaves 
room for special-ties partiality, but only within the regulative principle of 
global justice. 
Hume is well known for his ethics of partiality because he would say 
that impartial duty of beneficence to distant strangers is contrary to human 
nature. Yet Catherine Wilson tries to construct a "Humean" argument for 
our obligation to aid the distant needy based on a reconstruction of three 
principles that Hume states in his Treatise. Wilson aims to show that 
obligation to distant strangers need not be contrary to human nature as 
Hume sees it, and that one needn't construe an utilitarian argument, as do 
Singer and Arneson, to justify such obligation. Regarding the latter claim, 
rights-based cosmopolitans would readily agree with Wilson. 
The next two essays address the topic of the moral significance of 
temporal and cultural distance. Should norms and beliefs of distant times 
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and cultures be judged by the standards of our time and our culture? 
Nicholas Rescher says no, because he believes that to do so is morally in-
appropriate based on our own ideas of reasonableness, fairness, and 
justice. The morally right thing to do is to judge remote peoples by the 
standards of their time and culture. Rescher points out that this is not nec-
essarily relativism, at least not in the negative sense of rational and moral 
indifference. Standards of rationality and justice, as we construe them, 
demand that we do not judge the past by our own standards. 
Stephen Gardiner raises important ethical considerations in regard to 
the distant future. He identifies a core problem of temporal moral distance, 
and argues that this problem is the main concern of distinctively intergen-
erational ethics. At the heart of the problem is the idea that each generation 
is in a causally asymmetrical position with respect to its successors, and 
this creates problems of unfairness when temporally-diffuse goods are at 
stake. Gardiner argues that this problem is manifest in more or less degen-
erate forms in the real world, and that its relevance is not overshadowed 
by the presence of other future-oriented difficulties. 
In the last essay, Karen Green examines Peter Singer's utilitarianism. 
She believes that the universalizability requirement of Singer's position 
can be made compatible with partiality only if partiality is limited and 
justified by impartiality. However, she shows that this procedure may put 
to question some of Singer's utilitarian principles. Green believes that 
Singer is mistaken in directing his argument to each of us individually. 
Instead of this aggregate of individual responsibilities which generates ex-
cessively demanding moral obligation, she asserts that a system of 
"divided responsibility" should be developed in an institutional setting. 
Green says this would allow us to pursue a range of partialist projects, 
within limits, yet would respond more effectively to the alleviation of 
global poverty. 
As the essays cover a wide range of pertinent topics regarding the 
moral problem of distance, they shed light on the very scope of morality. 
They also bring into focus the important methodological issues in ethics 
such as the moral status of intuition and the competing claims of rival 
moral theories. While probing such enduring moral issues as morality and 
human nature, partiality versus impartiality, moral responsibility and indi-
vidual choice, moral and cultural relativism, and justice and human rights, 
the authors use the current debate to challenge and defend assumptions 
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about such central moral concepts as friendship, patriotism, and virtue. 
They also provide a context for public discourse on institutional policy 
matters. In today's global world, the moral problem of distance is espe-
cially challenging. These essays not only respond to the moral challenges 
of globalization but to the question of intergenerational justice. 
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